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Abstract 
Excessive levels of firing costs have been consistently blamed for the relatively weak 
employment performance in Europe, yet the conclusions to be drawn from the literature 
are somewhat an:tbiguous. This paper re-examines the impact of adjustment costs under 
uncertainty. It is shown that the interaction between the level of adjustment costs and the 
type of uncertainty can have important ramifications for employment dynamics. More 
specifically. we find that allowing for the possibility of transitory economic cOnditions 
results in a considerable increase in employment persistence. We conclude the analysis 
with a number of simulation exercises to iUustrate that allowing for changes in the 
economic environment in which firms have operated over the past two decades can 
considerably enhance our understanding of the evolution of employment within Europe. 
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Adjustment Costs, Uncertainty and Employmeut Inertia: 
1 Introduction: 
The presence of an overly regulated labour market has been consistently cited as one of the principle 
factors behind the relatively weaker perfonnance of European Community labour markets and the 
subsequent persistence of unemployment. The results of both applied and theoretical research on this 
issue is however somewhat ambiguous. Despite this, we feel that statistical evidence suggests that 
demand side factors play an important role in any explanation of the time series behaviour of 
employment (and thus unemployment). In this paper therefore, we extend the analysis of Bento lila and 
Bertola (1990) which applies stochastic control techniques recently developed in the Investment 
literature to the finn's labour demand decision, in order to assess the impact of changes in a number of 
factors on the demand side of the labour market, which we feel may be more relevant to the 
employment debat� than the present literature gives credit for. More specifically, we argue that: a) 
uncertainty, and especially the increases in the degree of uncertainty with respect to the nature of 
prevailing economic conditions that have occurred over the past twenty years� and b) the increases in 
hiring costs that occurred in the wake of the second oil price shock have. in the presence of adjustment 
costs, had an important impact on a firm's optimal employment strategy and thus on the dynamic 
behaviour of employment. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section two we briefly assess the argument that 
a si:SJlificant amount of unemployment within the European Community can be considered to be a 
consequence of insufficient employment growth. In section three we model the firm's employment 
decision in the presence of Ildjustment costs and uncertainty, extending the work of Bentolila and 
Bertola to allow for the possibility of transitory economic conditions. Section four offers a comparative 
static analysis of the effects of changes in a number of factors we feel to have had an increasing 
influence on a finn's employment decision in the 1980·s. We conclude in section five by diScussing the 
implications of our results for the employment protection debate and offer suggestions for future 
research. 
2 European Unemployment: a hiring problem? 
An analysis of labour force and employment statistics over the last two decades would tend to suggest 
that much of the unemployment problem in Europe is due to its inability to generate sufficient 
employment. For in contrast to other OECD countries, most notably the US 'and Japan, EC members 
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stales have over the past 15 years been, regardless of the prevailing economic conditions, .characterised 
by relatively weaker employment growth, with the majority of member states experiencing a stagnation 
in employment levels from 1973 onwards'. 
This view of European Unemployment as being I�gely a "hiring problem" receives further support from 
unemployment flow and duration data, which iUustrate that the increases in the stock of unemployment 
in the larger Community countries have been associated with: a) a substantial decline in the number of 
outflows from unemployment; and b) a subsequent build up in unemploym�t duration. For, although 
the risk: of becoming unemployed is much lower within the Community than for example, the US, the 
fact that unemployment outflow rates in Europe are significantly lower than those of the US implies that 
once an individual becomes unemployed in Europe it is much more difficult for him to find another job. 
In other words, the high levels' of unemployment which prevail within the EC appear to be primarily 
associated with a reduction in the ability of unemployed workers to find a job, rather than an increase in 
the likelihood of an employed individual losing hisjob. Such observations beg the question as to why 
the European employment performance has been so weak? 
Whilst this stagnation of employment growth in Europe, as in other OECD countries can, after the first 
oil shock, be primarily attributed to a combination of depressed· domestic and international demand 
conditions, with the subsequent slow down in the rate of output growth and decline in productivity 
levels aggravating the situation further. Employment growth in Europe remained at relatively low levels 
for much of the 1980's, despite the fact that from 1985 onwards the macroeconomic environment in the 
majority of the member states was in fact much more conducive to job creation. ]t is not until the end of 
the 1980's, a period of relatively low economic growth, that we observe record levels of employment 
growth within the majority of Community states. The US on the other hand has, despite an overvalued 
doUar and the subsequent substantial loss in export markets during the first half of the 1980's, 
experienced a rapid growth in employment throughout the 1980's. Thus they were to all intents and 
purposes able to offset the large increases in unemployment which occurred in the wake of the second 
oil price shock and the recession of the early 1980's. 
Whilst the substantial increase in fixed employment costs relative to wage rates which occurred in the 
European Community from the beginning of the 1970's has undoubtedly bad an adverse impact on 
employment growth, it has to be remembered that such increases were experienced, although to varying 
I It is interesting to note that in general this period of stagnation coincided with both a slower rate of labour force growth 
than that experienced for example, by the US, and a long term decline in the proportion of the population in employment 
Consequently, the increases that occurred in unemployment could be argued to be much lower than one might of 
expected, given the poor employment performance. 
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degrees, throughout the OEeD. Moreover, attributing the stagnation in employment solely to increased 
labour costs fails to explafu why European firms appear to have continued to substitute capital for 
labour during the 1�80's: despite a substantial decline in labour costs, a relatively slack labour market, a 
high real rate of interest and a fall in the relative cost ofJabour. This continual substitution of capital for 
labour has, given these developments, been repeatedly attributed to the fact that by the mid-1980's 
labour had become an increasingly fixed factor of production in Europe. Subsequently, the adverse 
impact on employment growth of the more regulated European Community markets has. during the 
latter half of the 1980's, been particularly prevalent in the US versus EC labour market performance 
debate. The general consensus appearing to have been that a more appropriate focus for research in the 
'quest' for an explanation of the behaviour of employment within US and the European Economies 
would be to focus on the changes in and the differences between employment protection legislation 
within the two regions. 
The appropriateness of explanations for the relatively weaker employment performance of the European 
Community which focus on �ther firing costs per se or on the speed of employment adjustment would 
appear to be drawn into question however. by: a) the superior performance of the EFTA countries, 
where firing costs are at least equivalent, if not higher� and b) the fact that comparative work on the 
speed of adjustment does not indicate any significant difference between the two regions. Employment 
protection does however, appear to have a fundamental impact on the dynamics of employment. For, 
an analysis of times series data on employment levels indicates that during so-called normal business 
cycles the time path of employment is in fact relatively smoother in those economies in which higher 
firing costs prevail. Suggesting then, that firms located i.n such environments tend to make relatively less 
adjustments to their work. force to changes in demand conditions than those finns operating in low cost 
environments. During periods of more prolonged recessions however, both high and low adjustment 
cost countries tend to experience a significant reduction in employment levels, with differences between 
these two regimes only appearing to emerge in the aftermath of such recessions. For, one would expect 
to (and one does in fact) observe a significantly smaller increase in employment levels during the 
ensuring upturn in economic activity in those countries in which ·higher adjustment costs prevail, with 
this trend being reflected in particularly low outflow rates from unemployment. This phenomenon 
appears to be especially true of European Community labour markets during the upturn in economic 
activity of the early 1980's. 
Focusing solely on the impact of employment protection and in particular on the impact of relatively 
high levels of firing costs on a firin's labour demand may therefore be somewhat too simplistic an 
approach to take. For. these observations tend to suggest that wh�t may be more relevant to an 
explanation of the dynamic behaviour of employment then the level of adjustment costs per se, is the 
lrtteraction of the existence of such a regulated regime with other factors affecting the firm's labour 
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demand decision. In particular, whether such interactions i�e place in low or high cost environments OL 
during very turbulent economic conditions. It would appear Decessary then, when trying to explain 
recent trends in employment to incorporate the significant changes that have occurred over the past 
decade in the degree of uncertainty with respect to the nature of the prevailing economic conditions into 
the finn's employment decision to determine what role, if any. it has had on employers hiring and firing 
decisions when the finn is faced with considerable restraints on employment adjustment. 
In the following section we therefore, adopt the methodology of Bentolila and Bertol. in order to 
examine the impact of: a) increases in the d.egree of uncertainty that firm's face with regards to general 
economic conditions; and b) changes in the level of adjustment costs and in particular changes in the 
level of hiring costs. Facto� which we argue to have become more relevant to the employment decision 
over the 1980's, but which have been somewhat overlooked in the literature. Extending this earlier 
analysis to allow for the possibility of transitory economic conditions, a modification which we feel to 
be more reflective of the characteristics of the general economic environment in which finns have found 
themselves operating in over the past 15 years. 
3 The Firm', Employmenl Dec:isioD under Unterlainly: 
Following Bentolil. and Bertol. (1990) we consider . partial equilibrium model of finn's employment 
decision in which the firm is assumed to: 
a) have a linear production function, in which homogenous labour, L, is the only input. 
1) 
where Qf represents production or sales and A. labour prQductivity. which is assumed to grow at 
the deterministic exponential rile, 8A, and r is time elapsed from a starting dale t, and 
b) face the following constant elasticity demand function: 
2) 
where Z denotes the finn's demand; P, the price of the finn's product and I' is the inverse of the 
finn's mark up factor. 
Uncertainty enters the model through changes in demand strength, which are asaumed to follow • 
stochastic process. In contrast to the Benlolil. and Bertola model where variations in demand strength, 
Z, are assumed to evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion process, we make what we feel to 
he the more realistic assumption, given events of the past twenty years, that in addition 10 theae stDOOth 
fluctuations in demand there exists the possibility that aggregate demand strength can be subject to 
discrete jumps. For analytical tractability the possibility of a jump in demand strength is modelled via the 
following Poisson jump process: 
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�' = I� JI'4" L�;-'Z,'-' I�, 
where: 110 is a given constant to be defined later, pA/L/,-tZ.I-" is the marginal revenue product of 
labour (MRPL); and dq is a jump process, the arrival rate of which foUows a Poisson distribution. If we 
define p as the mean arrival rate of a jump during an infinitesimal time period tit, then the probability 
that a jump will occur is given by pdt and the probability that no jump occurs is given by 1 _. pdt . 
Hence: 
dq� 0 with proba6ility 1- pdt and 
dq= I with probability pdt . 
Formulating the evolution of demand in this manner enables us therefore, to establish a link. between the 
size of the jump in demand and the distance of the MRPL from a given point 110' More �pecifica1lY. it 
will be argued that q, can be interpreted as an equilibrium value for q,. Thus the size of the jump in 
demand increases as the fum moves further away from the equilibrium level '10' 
In specifYing the jump process in this manner we are trying to capture the idea that 'good' times tend to 
be followed by 'bad' times. Thus although in the present model the firm should in principle (under 
Marshallian conditions) stay at the equilibrium level of the MRPL, if changes in CTtdwcause a vanation 
in demand so that the MRPL deviates from q" the firm thinks there is possibility that a jump in demand 
will occur, which will take it back to the equilibrium level, 1/,. Such a specification implies then that 
there is a level of demand Z" at which no jump occurs, where 1, is given by: 
One can think of this level as being an 'equilibrium' level of demand. It is slnlight forward to verilY that: 
a) dZ=() when either Z=() or Z is at its long run level; and b) that the jump in demand is positive if Z is 
below its equilibrium level and is negative if Z is above. 
Under such an assumption demand strength evolves according to the following 
Brownian-Jump process: 
dZ, 1 ( q, 
} Z=8zdt+uzdWr +� .. 11 J'L J'-IZ l-p 1 q. r fJ �r r r 
prOcess mixed 
3) 
where: {w,} is a standard Wiener process, i.e. the continuous time equivalent of a random walk, whose 
increments have instantaneous variance I and drift equal to zero and dq and dW are independent. thus 
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In other words, demand is assumed to fluctuate continuously according to a geometric Brownian 
motion process, but during each time inteIV8l dJ there exists the probability fXlt that a jump in demand 
will occur and that demand will thereafter continue to fluctuate according to the Brownian motion 
process until another jump occurs. As a Poisson jump does not occur very often. most of the time 
variance in demand will, within a short period of time, be determined by the Brownian motion 
component, uZdJ. When a jump does occur however, it leads to a significant deviation in demand thus 
it is essential that this possibility is incorporated into any calculation of the expected variance of demand 
made at time t. From equation 3; the expected rate of change of {Z} in our analysis will therefore be 
equal to: 
Thus in contrast to the Bentolila and Bertola model, where Z grows at an expected constant rate equal 
to the drift parameter in the Brownian motion process., the expected rate of growth of Z in our model 
actually decreases with Z. To obtain the expected future path of Z we simply solve the above differential 
equation for a given level of productivity, A, and labour, L. At time T, the expected value of Z will 
therefore be equal to: 
, 
E{ Z�} = [Z:-J< e(S,(I-J<)-p)h-t) + K( l_e(Sz(1-J<)-p)(r-l) )}I-J< , 
where K is a constant defined as: 
Thus when p=O the expected value of demand at time T will, as in Bentolila and Bertola analysis, be 
given by E, {Z�} = Z,e"z(r-I). For clarity, the expected value ofZ under the two alternative assumptions 
(ours and Bentolila and Beriola's) as to the stochastic process that demand follows is illustrated in 
figure 3.1. It should be evident that the size of the jump which takes the economy back to its 
equilibrium value increases in magnitude the further demand moves away from its long run equilibrium 
level. Thus the size of the expected jump will, despite the constant hazard rate p, also increase the 
further away demand is from its equilibrium value. As is evident from figuie 3.2, this will result in a 
lower expected rate of growth of Z in our analysis than that obtaioed by Bentolila and Bertola. 
The Finn's Optimisation Problem: 
[n order to compare the impact ofbiring and firing costs on a finn's optimal labour demand decision we 
initially assume that there are no costs associated with employment adjustment. The problem facing the 
optimising finn is to choose the profit maximising employment policy. 
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From the production and sales functions at time T, the firm's revenues, R, at time T can. using the fact 
that the marginal revenue from a CES demand function witt always be positive, given that equation one 
holds with equality, be defined as: 
Rt = Z:'-") (A. L. y, 
where productivity is assumed to grow at the deterministic rate: 
<lA, = .9 .A,dT, 
and labour to evolve according to the following process: 
dL. = -OLrdT. 
where cS is the constant rate at which employees are assumed to voluntarily leave their jobs. 
Total profits. J!, at time r are therefore given by: 
1fr 3Zrl-Jl(A,L.)J'-wL,. 
where the wage rate, w is for analytical tractability assumed to be constant. 
4) 
Taking wages as given, the firm sets its employment level in order to maximise the expected present 
value of future revenue over an infinite horizon. Thus it maximises the following value function: 
5) 
subject to the labour accumulation constraint: 
dLr = dX r -li.. dr. 
where: r denotes the rate of retum� dL, the cumulative labour turnover process� and {X t} represents 
hiring and firing. We also make the standard assumption that the value of the control variable must be 
chosen using the information available in the current period2. 
It is important to note however, that in determining its optimal employment level the firm has also to 
. consider the fact that its employment level will be affected by the number of voluntary quits. By 
hypothesis an individual worker can ,quit with a constant hazard rate cS at each moment in time, thus the 
probability that the worker remains with the firm over the period t to r is equal to e-�f'-I). Future 
profits of the finn over the time period I to r witt therefore, only be given by the expression on the right 
hand side of equation five if no quits occur. To allow for the possibility that a worker may quit we need, 
when calculating expected future profits, to weight the finn's value function in the following manner: 
2 Here then M are simply assuming that all the necessary information incorporated to make a forecast at any future date 
is in effect already incorporated in today's values. 
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The final term on the ,right hand side of the equation can however, be taken inside the expectations 
operator, since the parameter 0 does not change over time. Thus the function to be maximised 
becomes: 
v, = Max E{[e-I"'M'·')[1f ,drl}. 
(X,I I 
6) 
Partially differentiating equation six with respect to L in order to determine the profit maximising level 
of employment yields the following standard first order condition which is satisfied at all points in time 
when 'If = w: 
E{[ e-I'.'X'-')(�, - w)ir} = 0, 
where to maintain consistency of notation with the Bentolila and Bertola analysis:. the marginal revenue 
product of labour at time T is defined as being equal to 'If • }lI4:Z!-P V;' . 
According to the optimal lahour demand rule the firm should in the absence of adjustment costs: a) hire 
when the expected discounted marginal revenue product of labour of the additional worker is greater 
than the wage the firm has to pay the additional employee discounted back to the current time period; 
and b) fire the marginal worker when the expected marginal revenue product of this worker is less than 
the wage the firm has to pay the additional employee discounted back to the current time period. 
To deterntine the profit maximising level of employment we simply equate the discounted expected 
marginal revenue product of labour to the discounted wage the firm has to pay the worker in each 
period, i.e. w!!! .uA:Z!-P L�-'. Solving this expression for L the optimaI employment level in each time 
period will be given by: 
, 
L =[�APZ'-p�]'-p f /J f r W 
For a given wage, the firm's labour demand will be therefore, an increasing function of productivity and 
demand. Substituting this optimal level of labour demand back into the firm's profit fimction (given by 
equation four) we obtain thst the firm's profits in each period will be determined by: 
7) 
Recall thst in the absence of adjustment costs the firm's value function is given by: 
E{[ e-l,·,x'-')[If,dtl}= 
which from equation seven is equal to: 
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8) 
where E{Z,} is the expected value of the mixed Brownian-Poisson process that demand strength is 
assumed to follow. 
In order to evaluate the above function we need therefore to determine E{Zr}. To do so, we can make 
use of the definition of 'l. to rewrite the prOcess rol,lowed by Z as: 
dZ
, � Szdl+OztfW, +_
1_('1
0 -I)dq. 
Z, 1-11 '1, 
Thus demand will he at its equilibrium level, in the sense that jumps in demand do not occur, when 
'10 = TT .. · yve can also make us of the fact that in the no�adjustment cost scenario the profit maximising 
condition implies that TT, = W at all times, to set 110 = 'HI and to then interpret 1111 as the equilibrium 
value of "r' In other words the level it would obtain in the absence of adjustment costs. The process 
followed by Z can therefore he rewritten as: 
dZ, �S tit+o dW. +_1_('10 -I)dq. 
Zl 
z Z � 1-� w 
30) 
[t follows then, that if '1. "w there exists the possibility that a jump in Z will occur, which will he 
negative or positive depending on whether 110 < w or 110 > w . 
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) chapter 3, p.86, E{Z,} is the solution to the following stochaatic 
differential equation: 
E{dZ,} 1- = 
8z +-L('1. -I) . Z, d, 1-1' w 
The solution to which is given by: 
Thus if '1. < w ('1. > w) the expected level of Z at some point in time allot time ,will he lower 
(higher) than that which prevails in the Bentolila and Bertola model. Substituting the above solution 
bac� into equation eight we have that in the absence of adjustment costs the firm's value function will 
he given by: 
-'-( I )(A ):"[ -( .. O-Oo-"-x,-" (a,., ("'-'))(H) V=�I-II --I .....L e "-I Z,e 9'" dt, 
11 w ' 
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· -"-( I 
)( A ) ,
�, [ [ .,.t.;( !!<-,) • .,L_,_,]<.-., =jJl-... -- 1 � Z, e l-}l '" ... -1 dr. 
I' w ' 
which is bounded as long as r+o + 
1 
� ,u(.ua .. -t{'1rw -1)) -8, > O. 
The Firm's Optimisation Problem in the Presence of Linear Adjustment Costs: 
8a) 
We now tum to examine how the presence of linear asymmetric adjustment costs affects this optimaJ 
labour demand strategy. To do so, we assume that each addition to the work force by the firm incurs a 
hiring cost, H and that subsequent redundancies or other such contract terminations instigated by the 
firm incur a firing cost, F. with both H and F being payable by the fumJ. The existence of adjustment 
costs requires that the firm's value function be modified in the roHowing manner: 
V, = Max Ei f" e�""'-"[" ,dr - (I[ox.o[H -I F)dX,11 , Ix,] \ t I«<O! 9) 
where the function 1(.] is equal to 1 when the finn is hiring. i.e. dX, > 0, or firing in which case dX, < O. 
It is important to note however that, as the adjustment costs are a piece wise function, the cumulative 
labour process {Xi} fails to be differentiable. Thus the adjustment costs component of the integral must 
be expressed in tenns ofRiemann-Stiltjes integrals. 
Partially differentiating equation nine with respect to L in order to determine the optimal labour 
demand rule now yields the following three first order conditions, which must be valid at all times if the 
firm is in fact maximising its value function: 
ElI,-{(Fl. - w)e-(�"'6x,-l)d'l'} = -F 
-F < Elf'" (11. - w)e-(� .. 6xr-')d'l' < H 
E.f," (�, -w)e-<,,,x'-"dr = H 
if dXt <0, 
if dX, = 0, 
if dX, >0, 
lOa) 
lOb) 
IOc) 
These conditions imply that jf the finn is for example, considering whether to hire an additional worker 
it should calculate the discounted E{11} he would provide in order to detennine ho� this compares with 
3 F can be thought of as representing the severance costs imposed by finns legislation when dismissing a worker and Ii, 
as the screening and training costs associated with the recruitment of a new worker. 
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the wage it will have to pay the worker, discounted back to the current time period, plus any costs 
associated with the hiring. !f the E/I71 is less than the discounted wage, plus the hiring costs then an 
optimising finn will not hire, since the costs associated with increasing the work force by one unit are 
greater than the additional revenu� the extra worker brings to the firm. 
A1though intuitively obvious it is important to note the following. Firstly. in this analysis the two 
optimal trigger functions interact. In that increases in the cost of, for example, dismissing a worker 
affect the value of the hiring trigger point, since higher costs of abandonment makes firms more 
cautious about hiring. Similarly, reductions in the cost of hiring a worker will decrease the value of the 
firing trigger point. Secondly, the optimal trigger values and their Marshallian counterparts are not 
equivalent. In this framework, both the hiring and firing trigger points have higher and lower respective 
values than the Marshallian trigger conditions. 
It should also be evident that the optimising firm will not, given that the total cost of employment 
adjustment is linear in the hiring and firing costs, continuously act on the margin with respect to its 
employment decisions. Instead the optimal hiring and firing policy is discontinuous. In some periods the 
optimal policy for the finn will be to fire or hire, thus the optimal labour demand win be given by the 
solution to either lOa or tOe depending on which condition is satisfied. Under other demand conditions 
the optimal strategy for the finn niay be to take no action at all, but to instead allow the size of its work 
force to decline gradually through natural wastage. More specifically. inaction will be chosen when 
deviations of the expected marginal product of labour from its instantaneous maximum do not justify 
the costs of employment adjustment. Adjustments to its work force will only be observed when 
deviations in the expected marginal revenue product of labour from the optimal level are large enough 
to compensate for the hiring and firing costs. 
Hiring and firing costs result therefore in the existence of a corridor within which the opt1mal policy for 
the finn is not to react to �hanges in demand. Employment within this region being detennined by the 
previous period's employment level and the quit rate. As in the Bentotila and BertoIa analysis this 
region is identified by a constant upper, U, and a lower, d, 'control barrier'. If the marginal revenue 
product of labour falls below the lower control baIrier in response to say. an adverse shock the 
optimising finn will fire workers in order to raise {,,} back to the level of the lower control barrier. 
Similarly, if {I/l rises above the upper control barrier the firm will hire in order to restore {I/l back to 
the upper control barrier level. 
To detennine the optimal labour demand policy of the firm one needs therefore to identify this no-action 
region, this involves calculating the optimal upper and lower control barriers as functions of the 
parameters of the model. Thus we need to find an explicit expression for the integral in the first order 
-15-
conditions (FOCs) given by equations lOa to IOc. To find this. we can in the first instance rewrite these 
conditions exploiting the fact that wage rate is a constant. Doing so, condition lOa becomes: 
IfdX,<O. 
Similarly, condition 10e can be re-written as: 
E r -< •• 6X'-"d -E r -< .. -X'-"d = H , , TJ,e T ,w, e T ,  
E r -(,.. 6�r-')d =�+H , , TJ.e T r + 0 ' 
lOa') 
IOc') 
Now we simply have to evaluate the integrals on the left hand side of equation lOa' and lOe' taking into 
account the fact that 71, is not free to move, but is instead "regulated" at points '! and u so that the 
stochastic process, 71. never goes beyond the control barriers. 
When the finn is neither hiring or firing the marginal revenue pro.duct of labour evolves according to a 
mixed Brownian-jump process. Applying Ito's lemma for a mixed Brownian-Jump Process (see Dixit 
and Pindyck, chapter three, page 87) we can show that in the absence of regulation the marginal 
revenue product of labour evolves, given that 71 = F(A,Z, L), according to the following process: 
d,,= F,dA +F,dZ +FLdL+�F",(dZ)' 2 
= Jl' A'-'Z'-' Ir'8 • Ada !i.1-Jl)A'Z-' L"-' -[8,ZdT +u ,ZdW. + 1:1,(% -I}tq] 
-Jl(-I + Jl)A'Z'-' Ir'&.dT-±Jl'(I-Jl)A'Z-"'-' L'-'Z'u!dT 
= Jl'l8.da (1-Jl)'18,dT + (1-Jl)'1U ,dW, + '1 '1. - '1 dq + (1- Jl)'1liiT -� !i.1-Jl)'1u!dr '1 2 
= {Jl.9. +(1-Jl(9, +0 - Jl�')}T + ,,(1-Jl)u.dW, +(". -,,)dq 
where f)" and CT" are constant. 
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We need therefore to find the value of I � l. which solves the FOes given by equations lOa' and IOc' 
under the assumption that {1]} follows the above process. To detennine this value of 11 we are able to 
evaluate the integrals which appear in the FOCs using a similar argument to that developed in Bertola 
and Seotolila page p.386-7. modifying the procedure slightly to allow us to consider a mixed Brownian­
jump process. More specifically we make use of the following mathematical result (the proof of which 
can be found in the appendix) that using the regulated mixed Brownian-jump process {;,}. with starting 
point value � at time 0, whose dynamics in the absence of regulation are characterised by: 
� = �,dl +ol;,ctw, + (�o - �r)dq with an upper control barrier at u and a lower control barrier at d; 
then: 
+ ( p ) (�, + B ,��' + B,��') , A.+p-Sl. 
- f(�,�,;II,d,S,a,A.), II) 
where a] and 0.1 are the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation: 
and 
The DetenninatioD of the Optimal Hiring and Firing Trigger Points: 
We can. using the mathematical result of the previous section, evaluate the marginal revenue product of 
labour {TI} in the same manner in order to detennine the optimal hiring and fi.ring trigger points. We 
know that althe lower controrbarrier d. � = d. Similarly althe upper control barrier II, TJ = u. We can 
therefor� proceed by substituting the values of the constants of integration Bland B2 into the general 
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solution to our differential equation (equation A.7) for {�,}. Setting {�,} = {TIt}, A. = r +0 +p, 
,(} = ,(}., and cr .= cr., and substituting our general solution into the first order conditions lOa and lOc we 
obtain the following two conditions, which have to be satisfied at points d and 11 in order for the finn to 
be willing to fire and hire respectively: 
f(U'�o;u,d,3.,.a."r+a +p) = �+H. 
r+o 
lOa") 
lOc") 
Once the function/is known, these equations can be used to solve for the control baniers u and d for 
given values of the hiring and firing costs H and P. Having obtained numerical values for u and d, the 
optimal hiring and firing trigger points LN and LF can then be detennined as functions of both demand 
and labour productivity. Inverting the MRPL and evaluating it at l'It = d and l'It = U, we obtain the 
following two equations: 
1 
L = Z (1:) 1-, A'�' F I d " 
which describe the optimal labour demand policy of the firm. 
12a) 
12c) 
[0 figure 3.3 we plot the finn's optimal hiring and firing points for a given level of demand and 
productivity under the assumption that demand strength fluctuates over time according to a mixed 
Brownian-jump process. For comparative purposes, we also illustrate the optimal hiring and firing 
trigger points under the Bentolila and Bertola assumption that demand strength evolves according to a 
geometric Brownian Motion (given by the long discontinuous lines) and for the no�adjustment cost case 
H = F = 0 (the short discontinuous line). 
In contrast to the case in which there are no costs associated with employment adjustment, we see that 
the presence of adjustment costs results. as in the Bentolila and Bertola analysis, in a no-action region 
within which the optimal policy for the finn is not to adjust the size of its work force in response to 
changes in demand conditions. Employment within this region being instead detennined by the 
employment level of the previous period and the number of quits. Adjustments in employment will only 
be observed, when changes in demand result in a movement of the marginal value product of labour to 
either the hiring or firing trigger points. It is interesting to note however. that the fact that an employer 
merely 'perceives' there to be the possibility of a sudden change in demand strength at some point in 
5 As the solution to this function is highly non·linear, it has been obtained numerically using the computer prograrrune 
Mathematica. version 2.2. 
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the future has a fundamental impact on the dynamic behaviour of employment, since in our model it 
results in a considerable widening of the no-action corridor6. 
Demand can therefore fluctuate considerably more in our analysis than in the Bentolila and Bertola 
framework without warranting changes in employment adjustment. Consequently, employment will be 
seen to exhibit a much higher degree of persistence in environments in which finns perceive prevailing 
demand conditions to be «transitory", in the sense that there exists the possibility that the present state 
of nature will be subject to frequent change . .  Moreover, as figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the more 
"transitory" employers perceive present demand conditions to be in tenns of the value given to p, the 
wider the no-action corridor becomes. Conversely, smaller values of p, in other words a lower average 
arrival rate of jumps result in a shrinking of the width of the corridor. Thus for very small values of p 
our model converges, as figure 3.4 illustrates, towards that of Bentolita and Bertola and a much lower 
degree of persistence is observed7. In the first instance then, our analysis illustrates that the assumptions 
made about the type of uncertainty the finn faces or more specifically, the process utilised to model 
demand uncertainty in this type of analysis has, in the presence of adjustment costs, important 
ramifications for the dynamic behaviour of employment. 
The emergence of persistence within this framework in the aftennath of say, a negative demand shock. 
can be easily seen from the following example. Suppose that demand conditions were relatively buoyant 
prior to the shock, so that the MRPL of the marginal worker was such that the finn was located close 
to the hiring line. In contrast to the no-adjustment cost case where a negative shock would result in the 
instant dismissal of this worker, in our scenario the adverse shock may simply reduce the level ofMRPL 
so that the finn shifts back towards the firing barrier. As the optimal labour demand policy for a finn 
located within the no-action barrier is to maintain its present employment level, one does not observe 
any employment adjustment in response to this negative shock. Moreover, as is evident from the width 
of the no-action corridor in figure 3.3 it can, particularly in more uncertain environments. take a 
considerable negative demand shock in order for firings to occur. The degree of persistence observed 
will therefore be dependent on the length of time it takes the finn to reach the firing barrier, which will 
itself will be a function of: a) the width of the corridor; and b) the location of the fu:m imide the corridor 
prior to the shock. 
6 Note that this result is driven by the fact that employers perceive there to be the possibility of a discrete change in 
demand and is not therefore contingent on the change being realised. . 
7 For comparative purposes figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate what could be considered, in terms of the value given to P .  two 
polar cases. Since. p ::; 0.1 in our empirical work would imply that the finn perceived there to be a possibility of a change 
in economic conditions to be approximately 10 years. In contrast a value of 1.5 implies a change within eight months. 
Given the considerably shoner length of business cycles in the 1980's it seems reasonable to argue that the reality for this 
period lies somewhere in between these two extremes. For illustrative purposes however, this distinction is retained in the 
proceeding analysis. 
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An interesting implication of our analysis which emerges from figures 3.3 and 3.4 is that the possibility 
of a discrete change in future demand strength appears to have., in the presence of linear adjustment 
costs. an asymmetric impact on the optimal hiring and firing trigger points. More specifically, when the 
finn thinks that future demand is likely to be subject to more frequent change firing costs appear to have 
considerably more of an impact on the optimal demand policy of the firm. as reflected in a substantial 
upward shift of the firing line in more uncertain economic environments. In contrast changing the 
assumption as to the process which demand strength follows does not appear to have a significant 
impact on the finn's willingness to hire. In an increasingly transitory economic environment the optimal 
employment strategy would appear then, to imply a greater degree of labour hoarding over the business 
cycle. For. although greater uncertainty makes the finn more reluctant to hire. with the optimal policy 
stating that the finn should adjust less in the face of changing economic conditions given that it thinks 
demand strength is likely to change again suddenly in the near future., the positive employment effect 
(which arises from the upward shift in the firing function) would appear to offset any deterrent effect 
that this increase in uncertainty has on the hiring schedule. Naturally. the overall extent of these effects 
will be dependent on both the degree of risk aversion and the discount rate. 
4 Comparative Static Analysis: 
Having illustrated that allowing for the possibility of transitory economic conditions has important 
ramifications for the dynamic behaviour of employment. we proceed in this section to use the theoretical 
model derived above to carry out a number of comparative static analyses ·in order to examine how 
changes in factors. argued to be more relevant to a firm's labour demand decision in the 1980's, affect 
the finn's willingness to hire and fire via their impact on the position of the optimal hiring ind firing 
trigger schedules and thus ultimately the dynamic behaviour of employment. 
4.1 Effects of Chaoges in the Level of Firiog Costs 00 tbe Firm's Willingness to Hire aod Fire: 
Despite the fact that liberalisation of labour markets has ranked highly in the policy debate, few effective 
changes to the stringent nature of the employment constraints facing European firms appear to ·have 
been implemented over the last decade. The most recent European Commission report on the 
developments in and effects of employment protection legislation during the 1980's illustrates that 
despite the continual emphasis on the need for greater labour market flexibility only three countries can 
be considered to have weakened a number of employment protection regulations, with individual 
member states instead attempting to introduce greater labour market flexibility by loosening the 
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regulations concerning the use of temporary contracts8. Moreover, in a number of the European 
countries the general trend toward greater employment protection would actually appear to have 
continued. 
It would appear interesting given these developments and the predominance of the firing cost debate to 
examine the impact of changes in the level of firing costs under our assumption as to the way 
uncertainty enters the model in our model, to those attained when variations in demand strength are 
assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. For, it maybe the case that changes in the level of 
firing costs and increased uncertainty with respect to prevailing economic conditions has had an 
important impact on the evolution of employment during the 1980's. Moreover, given that the data 
illustrates marked differences in the evolution of employment between economies which are either 
tightly or loosely regulated in tenus of employment protection legislation, our analysis is undertaken for 
both high and low adjustment cost regimes using the values calculated by Bentolila and Bertola for the 
level of firing costs in France and the UK, assuming the former to be an example ofa higher cost regime 
and the latter a lower9. Throughout our empirical work we also make the more 'realistic' assumption 
for Europe that the level of tiring costs is greater than that of hiring costs. 
A priori the impact of higher firing costs on employment levels is somewhat ambiguous. For, on the one 
hand one would expect higher firing costs to have a positive impact on the employment level within the 
firm. since at the time of firing costs will be higher implying a lower marginal revenue product of labour 
and thus that less firing takes place. This positive impact may however, be offset if increases in firing 
costs have even more of an adverse impact on the firm' s willingness to hire. 
As is evident from the results of our comparative static analysis reported in the table 4. 1 the effects of 
an increase in the level of firing costs on the optimal employment strategy appear to be dependent on: a) 
the prevailing level of uncertainty with respect to the nature of current economic conditions; and b) the 
original level of firing costs. More specifically. increases in the level of firing costs in an economy 
characterised by a relatively low level of both firing costs and uncertainty appear to have only a 
marginal impact on the firm's optimal employment strategy (see figure 4.1). Resulting in an upward 
shift of the firing function of approximately 2.6% and a downward shift in the hiring function ofa mere 
8 Note however, that whilst these contracts have undoubtedly increased the ability of employers to adjust the size of their 
work fon::e in response to changing market conditions. it is only in the UK that the usc of use of such contracts is not 
subject to tight regulatory controls. 
9 Bentolila and Bertola provide estimates of the expected cost of dismissing a worker based on the estimation of the 
following relationship: F = N +(1 - p.lsp+ p. 1(1 - P.)(SP+ Lcl + p,.(UP+ LCll. who." N 'OJ" ... nlS the 
legal minimum period of notice requirement; �. the probability that the worker will bring an unfair dismissal claim 
against his employer before the judicial system; PM' the probability that an unfair dismissal ruling is given against the 
firm; SP. legally required severance pay; Lc' the legal costs involved in any contested dismissal: and UP, payment made 
with respect to any unfair dismissal ruling. This estimation yields a value of 0.687 over the period 1975 to 1979 and 0.916 
for France, over the period 1980 to 1986. The equivalent figures for the UK being 0.187 and 0.250 respectively. It should 
be noted howe\-er. as the authors themselves stress that these figures should be taken, given the nature of the data as "ball 
park" figures only. 
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0.5%. Whilst an increase in firing costs in an environment characterised by low costs, but a higher level 
of uncenainty results in a somewhat larger upward shift in the firing barrier, but has an even smaller 
impact on the hiring schedule. Resulting therefore, in a more noticeable increase in the width of the no­
action corridor. 
Table 4.1: 
Percentage Change in the Location of the Optimal Hiring and Firing Schedules in 
Response to an Increase in the General Level of Firing Costs. 
Less Uncertain Regime 
LF LN 
Low Cost Environment 2.6 
High Cost Environment 9.7 
·,)'s3 
-0.28 
More Uncertain Regime 
LF LN 
7.7 
73.4 
-0.19 
o 
In common with other studies our results indicate that an increase in firing costs has an asymmetric 
impact on the hiring and firing schedules. This result should not however be that surprising. For, as 
earlier work has shown (see for example, Benlolil. and Bertol. (1990) and Bertol. (\990» increases in 
firing costs have a stronger impact on the finn's firing decision than on its hiring decision if the firm 
realistically discounts future revenues, since at the time the firing decision takes place firing costs are 
neither uncertain or discounted. Thus, although higher firing costs cause the firm to be more reluctant 
to hire and therefore imply an adverse employment effect, this adverse impact is actually offset due to 
the myopic nature of the finn's employment decision, by the fact that the increase in costs discourages 
firing by more than it does hiring. Moreover, the more the firm discounts into the future and the less 
certain it is about whether or not they will have to fire the worker, the stronger will be their impact on 
the optimal firing schedule and the larger will be the positive impact of firing costs on employment. 
Somewhat more interesting results emerge from our analysis when we look at the interaction of changes 
in the level of firing costs in the so-called more uncertain environments. For, whilst an increase in the 
level of firing costs has a much more pronounced effect on the optimal employment strategy in both 
high and low cost regimes, such an increase appears to have a somewhat "perverse " impact on the 
optimal hiring and firing schedules in the high cost' environment. In that, although as one might expect, 
it significantly increases the reluctance of finns to fire in response to fluctuating demand conditions, it 
appears to have no impact at all on the firm's willingness to hire as reflected in the position of the 
optimal hiring line and thus results in a substantial widening of the no-action region (see figure 4.2). 
This lack of response of the hiring function to a change in the level of firing costs arises simply because 
larger values of p result in a lower value of the final tenn on the right hand side of the hiring condition. 
Turning our analysis on its head somewhat our results would also tend to imply that a reduction in the 
general level of firing costs in a more uncertain environment would, ceteris paribus, result in a 
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considerable lowering of the firing barrier and thus in firms being prepared to fire much more quickly in 
response to adverse changes in demand conditions. Such a scenario would in fact appear to offer one 
explanation for why we do not observe large numbers of dismissals in the UK. particularly in the 
manufacturing sector in the aftermath of the second oil shock. It is only in the post-1982 period after 
the relaxation of firing constraints, which would have resulted in a downward shift of the firing schedule 
that we observe the fall out in employment that might otherwise have been expected given the 
prevailing economic conditions of the late 1970's and early 1980·s. 
Our somewhat simplistic empirical analysis would appear to indicate then. that changes in the level of 
firing costs per se may not be the most relevant issue on which to focus. For, what appears to be a more 
relevant factor to an explanation of the evolution of employment, but which has been somewhat 
overlooked by the literature, is the interaction between firing costs and the degree of uncertainty, and in 
particular. whether this interaction takes place in a high or low cost envirorunent. 
An additional appealing facet of this type of analysis is that it would also appear capable of explaining 
the behaviour of employment in the US over the last decade. For, despite some initial hesitancy in hiring 
in .the US (reflected in a marked increase in the employment of temporary staff and the use of overtime) 
during the initial upswing of the early 1980's and 1990's recovery, the persistence effects associated 
with an adverse demand shock have clearly been much higher in Europe than in the US, where we have 
seen much more ora sustained increase in employment levels during the 1980's. Whilst it may not really 
be justifiable to argue that economic conditions have been significantly less uncertain in the US, the 
simple fact that the US labour market is much less regulated than those of the EC would appear to have 
had important consequences the dynamics of employment 10. What may be particularly relevant to the 
lower levels of employment persistence and the more rapid pick up in employment in the 1980's is the 
fact that that employment decisions in some sectors, most notably the unskilled and lower skilled service 
sector positions where a large part of the rapid employment growth of the 1980's has been 
concentrated, are not, given that hiring and firing costs associated with such positions would appear to 
be negligible, subject to anywhere near the degree of irreversibility that European employment decisions 
are. Consequently. the hiring and firing barriers in these sectors will be located extremely close to the 
no-adjustment cost line. Other things being equal, one would therefore expect the persistence effects of 
10 Whilst one cannot argue that firms in the US operate in a no-adjustment cost environment, since they still have to pay 
costs of hiring and training, it is a widely accepted fact that dismissal costs are relatively insignificant compared to 
European levels. 1Re industrial relations system in the US being dominated by the common law principle "hire at will" 
incorporated into the Labour Relations Act 1935, which stipulates that a firm in the private sector may dismiss a worker 
at anytime and for any reason without being legally obliged to give a minimum period of notice or pay a stahltory 
predetermined minimum level of dismissal costs to its workers. 
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demand shocks to be significantly dampened in these seeton, to observe relatively more employment 
adjustment and a much lower degree of employment persistence! I . 
The interaction between the level of firing costs and the degree of uncertainty cannot however, be the 
whole story behind the inferior employment experience of the member states during the 1980's, given 
that firing costs have actually been reduced in a number of European Community countries over recent 
yearsl2. Moreover, in countries such as France and Spain considerable (if somewhat erratic) relaxation 
of regulations regarding the use of non-pennanent contracts, which are not subject to the stringent 
employment regulations, have also been introduced. One would have expected. given the implications 
of our previous analysis, to have observed a sustained employment growth in those countries which in 
significant legislative changes have been made. Yet with the exception of the UK.., these countries have 
been amongst the lowest perfonners in the Community in tenns of employment creation, let alone 
sustained employment growth. This would appear to be particularly true of France, which despite a 
significant relaxation of firing restraints and a marked improvement in the macroeconomic climate from 
early 1986, has had one of the weakest job creation performances during the latter half of the 1980's. 
More importantly however, the results of our firing cost/uncertainty scenario fail to account for the 
seemingly increased reluctance on the part offinn's to t?'Pand their pennanent work force during most 
of the 1980' s, since their impact on the finn's willingness to hire. as reflected in the position of the 
optimal hiring barrier, is found to be minimal. Such a result suggests that other factors may have 
become more relevant to the firm's labour demand decision than previously thought during the 1980's. 
One explanation for the apparent reluctance of firms to hire during an upturn in economic activity is 
that: a) a number of legislative changes with regards to recruitment practices; b) developments in the 
system of wage negotiations; and c) the build up in unemployment and in particular long tenn 
unemployment, have resulted in a considerable increase in hiring costs and that these developments may 
have become a more important deterrent to hiring during this period of increased uncertainty, than 
changes in the already high level of firing costs. The most logical progression (and the one taken in the 
following section) would appear to be therefore, to extend our analysis further in order to examine the 
impact of such increases on the optimal employment strategy. 
11  What may a1so be an equally relevant factor to the high levels of employment growth experienced by the States in the 
early 1980's. but wbich is often overlooked in the literature is the fact that in Ole early 1980's rums were offered 
considerable fiscal incentives by the Reagan administration in order to encowage employment growth. which would have 
undoubIedly reduced the cost of biting to finns, 
12 In an attempt to gain greater labour market flexibility the British Government repealed a considerable amount of 
regulation concerning a finn's obligations to its workers in tenos of redundancy' payments from 1981 onwards. Similarly. 
in 1986 the FmlCh repealed legislation obliging !inns to obtain permission from the Public Authorities for all economic 
dismissals. Prior to this. all dismissals for economic reasons required the direct auth9risation of the regional labour office. 
The director of which had the power not only delay the dismissal procedure, but actually to prevent the dismissals from 
taking place. Although outright prevention was not frequently used, the major obstacle to mass dismissals was the 
procedure which rums had (0 go to in order to obtain authorisation. which was extremely costly and time consuming. 
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4.2 Tbe Impact of Changes in Hiring Costs on the Optima. Trigger Points: 
As already discussed the impact of firing costs on a finn's labour demand decision has tended to 
dominate the adjustment costs literature with only a passing reference, if any, being made to the role of 
hiring costs. We have two objections with regards to the appropriateness of this approach. Firstly, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, explanations for the differing employment and unemployment experiences 
of OECD countries based solely on higher firing costs are, as already mentioned, unable to explain why 
countries such as the Scandinavian ones have experienced superior employment performances over the 
1970's and 1980's. Secondly, it would appear that the rise in hiring costs has. with increases in the 
stock of unemployment and the emergence of a body of long tenn unemployment undoubtedly raising 
the signal extraction problem facing European finns in the 1980's, been significantly larger than that of 
firing costs. 
It should also be remembered that recruitment costs are only part of the costs that firms incur when 
recruiting additional workers. For, once a new employee has been hired, a finn then incurs costs of 
training and costs associated with loss of output during this training period. Moreover, in some 
countries, such as in Italy and to a lesser extent France where recruitment is channelled through national 
employment agencies, finns are not always free to hire the workers they want. In these countries the 
unemployed tend to be ranked according to a number of social criteria, such as marital status, number 
of dependants, length of unemployment duration. Criteria, which are used to calculate the individual's 
need for employment, as opposed to their suitability for available vacancies in terms of qualifications 
and willingness to work. Employers are then required to make at least some of their new hires from this 
ranking: Obviously the use of such a procedure does not always result iil the best candidate being 
selected for the jobs. In fact, given the nature of the ranking system, it would appear more rational to 
assume that more often than not the best candidate is not selected. Costs in tenns of training and lost 
output would therefore be expected to be considerably higher in: a) those economies in which such 
systems operate; and b) times of high unemployment and an increasing incidence of long tenn 
unemployment,_ given that it would appear likely that those individuals with longer unemployment 
duration will be positioned higher in the ranking order. Human capital and duration dependence 
arguments would imply that such individuals are likely to prove most costly to the finn in terms of 
training and output lost during training. 
As one would expect, given that at the time of hiring these costs are neither uncertain or discounted., 
allowing for an increase of approximately 25% in the level of hiring costs has a direct impact on the 
hiring schedulel). Increases in their value resulting in the finn becoming less willing to hire in response 
13 This figure has, as in the Bertola and Bentolila analysis, been taken from Nollen (l987) and is based solely on training 
cost>. 
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to changing economic conditions, with this increased hesitancy being reflected in a downward shift in 
the optimal hiring line. Once again however, it is evident from the results of table 4.2 that the 
interaction between changes in the level of hiring costs and the degree of uncertainty has important 
ramifications for employment dynamics. For, although an increase in hiring costs results, regardless of 
whether the firm is located in a high or low cost environment, in the finn becoming less willing to hire in 
response to changing economic conditions, this effect is greater in the more uncertain economic 
environment. 
Table 4.2: 
The Percentage Change in the Location of the Optimal Hiring and Firing Schedules in 
Response to an Increase in the General Level of Hiring Costs: 
Low Cost Environment 
High Cost Environment 
Less Uncenain Regime 
LF LH 
I.' 
0.9 
-2.9 
·2.5 
More Uncertain Regime 
LF LH 
6.' 
18.2 
-5.6 
·5.5 
Although the effects of an increase in the general level of hiring costs on the hiring decision are clearly 
evident from the FOe (given by equation l Oc), their impact on the firing decision is not so readily 
apparent. To see this more clearly we can however, rewrite the FOC lOa using a similar argument to 
th.t developed in Bentolil. and Bertol. (p.391), so that hiring costs .ppear explicitly in the firing 
condition. To do so we assume: a) that the firm is at period I, a point in time at which the marginal 
worker has just be fired; and b) that T is the first moment in time after period t, in which demand 
strength is such that the firm considers hiring an additional worker. The firing condition can therefore be 
rewritten in the following manner: 
13) 
We can then proceed, given that the strong Markov property of the regulated mixed Brownian-jump 
process implies that T and TJr are independent, to separate the second term in parenthesis into the 
product of the two expectations. Rearranging and taking iterated expectations we obtain: 
E, {r'l,e'(" " PXH1dr) 
= r :" -F - E, (e'("" PIT" I)E, {ET {f; '1,e-{'·'·PX'-T1dr)} . 14) 
As T is a hiring time we know from condition 10c that: 
ET {r TJre-cr.6*Pxr-T1d-r) = �+H . Jr r+o  
Substituting the right hand side of which back into equation 1 4  the firing condition becomes: 
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ciX1 < 0, dXr > 0, T > t .  
Thus the firm fires the marginal worker, knowing that future demand conditions could be such that it 
becomes profitable for it to rehire him again at the random time T, if the loss the finn would incur 
between t and T (given by first term on the right hand side of the firing condition) if it did not fire the 
worker plus the future cost of rehiring the worker at T are, in expected discounted terms, equal to the 
current firing costs. Increases in the level of hiring costs will result therefore, in the firm becoming more 
reluctant to fire. Moreover, a higher degree of demand uncertainty, determined by a value of p >  0 ,  
will lower both: a) the expected value of the loss incurred by the finn if the marginaJ worker is not fired; 
and b) the present vaJue of future rehiring costs, thereby making, as is evident from the results in table 
4.2. the finn more reluctant to fire. 
It is interesting to note however, that from the results of table 4.2, the impact of such an increase results 
in a much larger reduction in hiring than firing in less uncertain regimes and thus will, other things being 
equal, lead to a reduction in the firm's employment level over the cycle 
4.3 The Effect of a Regime Change on the Optimal Employment Strategy of the Firm: 
�ropean firms in the 1980's have undoubtedly faced a very different economic environment to that in 
which they had operated during the previous decade, not only in tenns of the level of hiring and firing 
costs, but also with regards to the generaJ level of uncertainty with respect to the nature of prevailing 
economic conditions. For, in contrast to the 1970's, the 1980's can, from the finn's perspective. be 
characterised as a period of: increasing hiring costs; a substantial reduction in employment to 
employment transitions (quits); and an increase in the level of uncertainty with respect to the nature of 
the prevailing economic conditions. From the analysis undertaken so far, it should be evident that the 
model derived above provides us with a particularly useful apparatus for examining the impact of such a 
regime change on the firm's willingness to hire and fire, as reflected in the behaviour of their optimal 
hiring and firing trigger points. In this section therefore, we allow for simultaneous changes in factors 
argued to have been relevant to the firm's labour demand decision during the 1970's and 1980's, in the 
hope that an analysis of the impact of such changes on the finn's optimal employment strategy can offer 
additional insights into the evolution of employment within the EC over the past fifteen years. 
Perhaps the most significant change in the economic environment facing the firm over the last two and a 
half decades has been the ·increases in the level of uncertainty with respect to the prevailing economic 
conditions that have occurred during the 1980·s. Changes which have been such that it would appear 
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reasonable to argue that labour demand decisions have gone from being taken in a relatively low 
uncertain to a more uncertain economic environment. 
Recall from section three that uncertainty enters into our model through changes in the evolution of 
demand strength, which is assumed to evolve according to the following mixed Brownian-jump 
stochastic process: 
Increases in uncertainty can therefore be allowed for via changes in the value of u:, as considered in the 
Bentolila and Bertola analysis, and by increases in the value of p .  In our simulation we allow for 
changes in uncertainty with respect to the future economic conditions by: a) increases in the variance of 
demand uz; and b) by assigning a higher value to p .  In making these assumptions then, we are not only 
allowing for the fact that economic conditions in the 1980's were more volatile (i.e. that demand has 
been subject to much larger fluctuations during the 1980's), but also that economic cycles were shorter. 
The remaining parameter values are calculated as follows. In common with Bentolila and Bertola we 
assume hiring costs in the 1970's to be equal to one month's pay. We make the further assumption that 
hiring costs increased by 35% over the two periods. A caveat is in order here however, since this figure 
is based solely on the average increase in recruitment expenditure reported in the company accounts of 
100 UK finns. It does not therefore take into account increases in the cost of training and loss of output 
that any deterioration in worker quality or prolonged recruitment procedures will have involved and 
thus should be treated as a lower bound 14. The British quit rate for the two periods is taken from 
Burgess and Nickell (1987), whose empirical analysis suggests an average quit rate in Great Britain of 
2.1 over the period 1973-1979 and 1 . 1% for the 1980's. The number of employment to employment 
transitions recorded in the French labour Force Survey is used. to construct a French quit series for the 
two periods. We take the average of the annual rate of return, T, reported in the business sector as an 
indicator of the rate of return, which in the 1970's (1980's) is assumed to be equal to 9.85% ( 9.6% ) in 
Great Britain and 12.2% ( 12% ) in France. As in Bentolila and Bertola, the remaining parameters Uz 
and 8 z were proxied using the average percentage change in the first differences of the logarithm of the 
industrial production index and three times the annual average standard deviation of the first differenceS 
of the logarithm of industrial production respectively. 
The effects of such a regime change on the optimal hiring and firing trigger points for a firm operating 
in a low cost environment are clearly evident from figure 4.3, where the discontinuous lines represent 
the so-called lower-costilow-uncertainty regime and the continuous lines a more volatile economic 
14 These finns were however. selected across industrial groupings in an attempt to obtain a more representative sample of 
recruitment costs in terms of occupaLional classification. 
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climate, with a higher demand uncertainty in tenns Qf the values assigned to both Uz and p and higher 
costs of adjustment. In order to facilitate the comparison of the effects of the regime change on the 
location of the hiring and firing barriers under the different cost environments we also report. in table 
4.3, the percentage change in the hiring and firing trigger points as a result of the regime change. 
Table 4.3: 
Percentage Change in the Location of the Optimal Hiring and Firing Schedules 
as a Result of the Regime Change: 
Low Cost Environment 
High Cost Environment 
Bentolila and Bertola Model 
LF LH 
3.6 
3.7 
4.6 
-8.2 
20.2 
44.6 
-8.9 
-11.5 
These results illustrate that a switch to a combination of greater uncertainty, lower quits and higher 
hiring costs has a significant impa�t on the optimal employme�t strategy of the finn as reflected in the 
behaviour of the finn's optimal hiring and firing trigger points, with the firm becoming more reluctant to 
both hire and fire in response to fluctuating demand conditions, regardless of the type of environment in 
which these changes take place. Once again however, the results obtained illustrate that: a) this regime 
change would appear to have had more of an impact on the finn's firing decision, with the upward shift 
in the firing barrier clearly dominating any hiring eff� and thus resulting in a considerable widening of 
the no-action corridor; and b) the adverse effects of such a regime change are mOTe acutely felt by the 
finn operating in a high cost environment. 
The interaction between the change in economic conditions e�perienced by European finns between the 
1970's and 1980's and the changes that occurred in the institutional characteristics of the markets 
within which these �nns operated would appear. therefore, to have had an important impact on the 
dynamic behaviour of employment. In particular, the considerable widening of the no-action corridor 
which occurs in the aftermath of such a regime change would imply that demand strength can fluctuate 
much more in the high cost/more uncertain environment without leading to changes in employment. 
Thus one would expect to observe ceteris paribus a much higher degree of employment persistence in a 
1980's style environment than in the 1970's, with employment in those economies characterised by a 
relatively high level of adjustment costs exhibiting relatively more persistence. 
It is interesting at this point of the analysis to compare the impact of such a regime change under our 
assumption that demand strength evolves according to a mixed Brownian-jump process, with that 
obtained under the Bentolila and Bertola assumption that demand evolves according to a geometric 
Brownian motion process. From the results of such a comparison (see table 4.3 and figure 4.4, where 
the functions labelled BBF and BBH represent the Bentolila and Bertola hiring and firing schedules), it 
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is evident that allowing for this additional source of uncertainty, together with changes in the 
institutional characteristics of the environment in which firms operate has considerably mor� of an 
impact on the optimal employment strategy of the finn and thus on the dynamic behaviour of 
employment. More specifically, when we allow for the possibility of "transitory" economic conditions, 
such a regime change results in: a) a more pronounceq increase in the width of the no-action corridor 
and thus in a much higher degree of employment persistence; and b) a more significant· downward shift 
in the hiring function. 
The implications of our model would appear therefore. to be more consistent with statistical evidence 
which indicates that firms have during the upswings in economic act�vity during the 1980's become 
more reluctant to make adjustments to their employment levels. Finns instead being prepared to 
increase overtime rates or to pay considerable amounts of commission to hire temporary staff in order 
to cope with fluctuations in economic conditions rather than make permanent expansions to their work 
force, when they are unsure whether economic conditions can be considered transitory or pennanent. 
Furthennore, this approach would not only appear to offer an explanation for the higher degree of 
employment persistence observed in Europe during the 1980' s, but also to go some way to providing an 
explanation for the differences in the behaviour of employment within individual Community member 
countries. 
What, if anything, can our analysis tell us about long run labour demand? As already discussed, the 
employment outcome of such a regime switch will depend on the magnitude of the change in the hiring 
and firing trigger points. In other words which trigger point reacts more strongly to the change in 
regime. If, as in our case, the regime change deters firing more than hiring then overall one would 
expect to observe an increase in the finn's employment level over the course of the business cycle in 
both high and low cost environments. It is difficult however, given the model as it stands. to di'scuss the 
implications of such a regime change on long run labour demand, since in the long run labour demand 
will, amongst other things, be dependent on the level of wages, which for simplicity are assumed here to 
be constant. Moreover, iflabour obtains an increasing share of output over time (as our assumption of 
constant wages and increasing employment would tend to imply) one would expect to observe a 
reduction in the finn's level of investment, which would itself have significant ramifications for the level 
of employment. An obvious extension to this analysis would be therefore, the relaxation of the constant 
wage assumption. Modifying the model in this manner would not only enable us to examine the 
robustness of our results of allowing for non-constant wages, but more important1y would allow us to 
analyse the impact of changes in both the level of adjustment costs and uncertainty on long run labour 
demand and thus on the level of employment itself. 
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5 Effects of Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty under Different Market Structures: a.note. 
Finally, an interesting feature of this model is that it allows us in a sense to look at the optimal labour 
demand policy in the presence of adjustment costs and uncertainty under different market conditions 
and to see therefore, how employment evolves over time under different market structures. Recall from 
our initial description of the model in section three that jJ represents the inverse of the finn's mark-up. 
The assignment of a value of jJ = 0.7 in the above empirical work implies that we have up until now 
been looking at the impact of adjustment costs and changes in uncertainty on the optimal employment 
strategy of a firm operating in a relatively competitive market. It would appear worthwhile however, 
given the structure of a number of European Community economies, to focus briefly on the impact of 
adjustment costs and uncertainty on the optimal employment strategy of a firm operating under more 
monopolistic conditions. In order to examine how changes in the value of jJ, in other words changes in 
the underlying market conditions in which the firm operates, affects the characteristics of the firm's 
optimal employment strategy and thus the behaviour of employment. 
It is evident from figure 5.1,  where we illustrate the optimal hiring and firing trigger points for a firm 
operating under relatively competitive market conditions (represented by the discontinuous lines) and a 
finn operating within a more monopolistic framework, that other things being equal the presence of 
adjustment costs has a much larger impact on the optimal employment strategy for a firm operating 
under more competitive market conditions. In contrast, the move towards a more monopolistic market 
structure (characterised in this analysis by setting jJ = OJ) results in a considerable narrowing of the no­
action corridor, with the corridor also appearing to pivot and shift down towards the horizontal axis. 
Indicating then, that an optimising finn operating in a more monopolistic environment will tend to 
adjust its work force considerably more than its competitive counterpart in the face of changing 
economic conditions. It would appear therefore, that the more competitive is the market in which the 
firm operates the wider the no-action corridor becomes and thus the more persistence employment 
exhibits. The width of the corridor being ceteris paribus an increasing function of jJ, until it becomes 
infinitely wide under perfectly competitive market conditions, in other words when jJ = 1 (see figure 
5.2). 
In a monopolistic market employment protection legislation per se would not appear to have such 
important implications for the willingness of firm's to hire and fire in the face of fluctuating demand 
conditions. For, the optimal employment strategy, as reflected in the location of the hiring and firing 
barriers, implies that the monopolistic firm adjusts its work force considerably more in response to 
changing economic conditions than its competitive counterpart. This result would tend to suggest then, 
that the effectiveness oflegislation introduced in order to protect the individual worker would appear to 
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be dependent on the characteristics of the market structure in which the worker is employed. More 
specifically. such legislation appears to offer, ceteris paribus, a considerably higher degree of protection 
to workers employed in a more competitive market. Consequently, the advantages of labour market 
liberalisation in tenns of increased flexibility would appear to be greater in those economies with more 
competitive market structures. 
6 Concluding Remarks: 
Recently a number of authors (see for example, AJogoskoufis et at. (1995» have claimed that 
deregulation is not the answer to the Community's relatively weak labour market perfonnance,. arguing 
instead that the characterisation of European labour markets as being sclerotic in nature would appear 
to be a misconception, given that the more recent studies of job creation and job destruction indicate 
that these rates are in Europe at levels comparable to those of the US. As further support for the 
inappropriateness of the "anti-deregulation" campaign. the authors emphasise that despite being a 
continual feature of the policy debate for much of the 1980's, the deregulation that has tak.e� place_ 
would appear to have simply resulted in unemployment exhibiting a much greater degree of volatility 
and not as originally advocated in a sustained decrease in unemployment rateslS. 
Such an argument is not inconsistent with existing theoretical work (see for example Bentolila and 
Bertola 1990) on the impact of adjustment costs on employment (and thus ultimately unemployment). 
In our analysis we have shown., using simple simulation techniques, that with a relatively low level of 
uncertainty with respect to general macroeconomic conditions (i.e. a small value of p) the no-action 
corridor remains relatively narrow. It is evident however from our analysis that hiring and firing costs 
become increasingly more relevant, in that their presence has more important ramifications for the 
dynamic behaviour of employment, as the level of uncertainty inc�eases and particularly. when economic 
fluctuations occur more frequently. yve find that allowing for the possibility of " transitory" demand 
conditions results in a considerable widening of the no--action region and thus a significantly higher 
degree of employment persistence is observed. O�ering one explanation then, for Europe's apparent 
IS The increases in the volatility of unemployment that have been experienced in a number of European countries can 
however, be explained by the type of deregulation that has taken place. For. it is not that surprising, given the nature of 
these employment contracts together with the fonn of regulatory conditions imposed on their use.. that the introduction of 
new iegjslation to allow finn to bypass the e:dsting stringent employment protection by extending the use of part-time and 
short term contracts has led to a significant increase in labour market turnover and thus in the volatility of unemployment. 
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inability to generate sufficient employment growth, despite a generaJ improvement in economic 
conditions from 1985 onwards. 
Although one has to be careful when drawing conclusions from this type of analysis, given its 
comparative static nature, a number of interesting issues emerge from this study. Firstly, it would 
appear that focusing on the level of adjustment costs per se may be inappropriate, given that the results 
obtained indicate that it is the interaction between adjustment costs and the level of uncertainty, 
together with the type of environment in which this interaction takes place, which appear to have more 
important ramifications for employment dynamics. Of particular interest to the current policy debate is 
the fact that our analysis indicates that changes in the level of adjustment costs appear to have more of 
an impact on the finn's willingness to hire and fire (and thus on its overall employment level) in response 
to changing economic conditions, in environments characterised by both a high level of adjustment costs 
and a higher degree of uncertainty. The results of section 4.1 for example, imply that changes in the 
level of firing costs in countries such as France, ItaJy and Spain characterised as being high adjustment 
cost regimes will have considerably more of an impact, the higher the prevailing degree of uncertainty. 
It is not that surprising then, that the reductions in the level of firing costs which have taken place have 
not had such a significant impact in terms of their impact on sustained employment growth. since the 
most substantive steps towards labour market tiberalisation have taken place in economies, such as the 
UK, aJready acknowledged to be low cost regimes. 
Secondly, the results of our analysis of sections 4.2 and 4.3 would tend to suggest that allowing for 
changes in both: a) the economic environment within which firms have operated; and b) the 
considerable increases in hiring costs which have occurred over the past 15 or so years, in models of 
the firm's labour demand decision can go help to explain the differences in the times series be
.
haviour of 
employment over the past two decades both within the European Community and across different 
economic areas. such as Europe and North America. Furthermore, such an analysis could prove to be 
useful in the identification of factors for policy targeting. For, our results would tend to suggest that a 
more effective area for labour market policy, in terms of encouraging sustained employment growth, 
may be to focus its attention on ways to lower the escalating hiring costs (and thereby reducing the 
signal extraction problem) that firms have had to bear since the early 1980's, rather than to continue to 
focus on the detrimental aspects of firing costs, which have not been subject to such significant changes 
during this period. 
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Appendix 
Proof: 
The methodology of Harrison (1985, Chapter Five) can also be adopted to the case of a regulated 
Brownian motion with jumps. Thus we redefine the regulated process, {�f} as follows: 
l;f ;' �fD,V, 
where: 
i) {c;,} is a mixed Brownian jump process, which evolves according to the following stochastic 
differential equation: d(,. =�,9d1 +�,adw, +(�o -� ,)adq and has an initial value � ,  d � � � u ;  
ii) {V,} and {D,} are increasing and continuous processes, with l5 ;. [j = 1 ;  
iii) {D,} only increases when �, ;. d, and {V,} only increases when l;, ;. u, where u and d are positive 
real numbers; 
iv) d � l;, .s: II for all t � o. 
The arguments of Harrison (1985, p.22) illustrate that propenies i to iv uniquely identify the processes 
{V,} and {Df}, which ensure that the process {�, } remains within the control barriers., with control only 
occurring when {�,} would exit [d,u]with probability one in the absence of regu1ation. Applying Ito's 
lemma to l;, ;. �,D,V, we obtain: 
�, = D, d:" +�dD, _ D; dU" U, U, V, 
given that a non4decreasing process has a finite variance, (dU,)2 ::= (dD,)2 = o .  
lfwe now consider now a function of f(l;) : 
f(r) = Eolte-... �,dllf = rj A.l) 
From Harrison (1985) page 81, we know that {l;,} is a Markov process in levels, the conditional 
expectation is therefore only a function of the starting value. Thus we have., by time homogeneity and 
Ito's lemma for a mixed Brownian4jump process, that: 
df(�) = J(�)d�+.!. f'(�Xd�)' 2 
= J[.9¥1 + ugiW +(�o -�)dql+� f'(�)u'�'dt 
= [t (�)Ii? + �' J" (��' }I + if (�)CPW 
+(�o -�)J(�)dq+J£dD-J D,dU U U  
From property (iii), dD, = 0 unless � = d and dU, = 0 unless � = u, we obtain that: 
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dfW = ( .9j'W�+ <72
2 
J"(�W)dJ +qf WgIW 
-t{�, - �)J dq+dj'(d)dD _uj'(u)dU D U 
Applying the integration by parts formula given in Harrison (1983, p. \32) to the process (J(�)e'�) we 
obtain23; 
e'· f(�,) = f(�o)+ J:e-'{ �k)�, + �' fk)�: -)jk)}v 
+f:e-"4kkdW + f: e " (� ,-dj'(� ,)dq 
+dj'(d)f' e'" dD -uj' (u)f' e'" dU " D  " U  
A.2) 
Taking expectations of the above at time zero and letting t � 00, the left hand side vanishes for A. > 0, 
provided that f( �, ) is bounded. The stochastic integral in dW, on the right hand side vanishes as long 
as f' (�, �, is bounded and the last two terms on the right vanish provided that: 
and 
1Ij'(II) = 0, 
which we are going to impose. 
Taking expectations of the integral: �J: e-�] 
EV(�,)(�, -�,)dq} = pV(�, +�d,)-j'(�,)}dt 
= p[j'(�,)-j'(�, )ldt 
Equation A.I can therefore be rewritten as: 
0 =  f(�,)+ E,{I: e·.[ .9f (f,)f, + �' f"(f,)f� -M(f,)H 
+r e'· P(f(fo)- f(f,))dt . 
A.3) 
A.4) 
23 Which is also valid for a mixed Brownian-jwnp process., since we know from Royden-(1968) that it is valid for any VF 
(Variation Finite) function. 
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As the term r e-M P(f(f,) -f(f, ))ctl is non-stochastic it can be taken inside the expectations 
operator. Thus: 
f(f,)= -d: e-'[l(f,)f, + �' J"(f,)e -(.!- P)f(f,)+ d(f,)}' 
For this to be equal to equation A.I the following differential equation must be satisfied: 
, 
-�" = lll(�"�" + � j"(q�; - (A.+p)f(�")+pf(�,) . AS) 
The general solution to which is: 
f(f) = I [f+B,f" + B,f·' ]+---E-f(f,) . A6) .! + p- 8 .! +p 
where: B] and B2 are constants of integration to be determined by the boundary conditions and: 
a, =C,*�' -a)+ ((< +ll)' + 2cr'(A. +p)) ] 
and 
From equation A.6. we can evaluate the value of 1(';0) by solving the following: 
f(�,) I [�, + B,�:' +B,�:' l +-P-f(�,) A.+p- ll A.+p 
Thus we obtain that: 
f(�') A.�P A.+�_ll [�, +B,�:. +B,�:'l ·  
or 
The final general solution can be obtained by substituting f(�o) back into A.6 as follows: 
A7) 
Note that �o is the point where the process � jumps to and that it is in principle different from the initial 
point � .  
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To check that the function (A. 7) is indeed a solution to our differential equation we can calculate its 
first two der ivati ves and sub stitute them back into the equation A.5 in order to show that it is in fact 
satisfied. 
f(�) = 1..+�-ll  [1 +a,B, �·,-' + B,a,�" -' ] 
F(�) = 
1 [l +a , (a, - 1)B,�" -' +a,(a, -1)B,�·,-,] . 1.. +p-ll  
Sub stituting into the differential equation we ob tain: 
a'} 
_� = II [� + B,�" + B,�" ]+ 1 2 [a,(a, - 1)B,�" +a,(a, - 1)B,�" ] 1.. + p - ll  1..+p-ll  
1.. + p [� + B,�" +B,�., ] . 1.. + p - ll  
This is true if: 
-:--=-7 + 1 - + ' Sa, +-a,(a, - I) -(1.. +p) 
[ II 1.. +p f B �" [ a' 
] 1.. + p- ll 1.. + p - ll  1.. + p- ll  2 
B �" [ a' 
] 
+ ' Sa, +-a,(a, - 1)- (1.. +p) = 0 , 
1.. + p - ll  2 
which holds as long as ClJ,Cl2 are the sol utions of: 
a' ( a') 
Ta
' + ll -T a
-(1.. + p) = O .  
Finally, to determine the constants of integration BI and B2• we impose the boundar y conditions: 
and 
uf(u) = 0, 
to obtai n: 
d 
[l +a B dtt,-I +B a  dfJ.1-1 ] = 0 A+p- 8 I I 1 1 
and 
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Bl is therefore given by: 
and B, by: 
B, 
Substituting these values into equation A. 7 the proof is complete. 
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Figure 3.1: 
The Expected Value of the Demand Strength under the Two Alternative Demand Assumptions: 
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